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Background: Marburg viruses have been responsible for a number of outbreaks throughout sub-Saharan Africa, as
well as a number of laboratory infections. Despite many years of experience with the viruses, little is known about
several important epidemiologic parameters relating to the development of Marburg virus disease. The analysis uses
pooled data from all Marburg cases between 1967 and 2008 to develop estimates for the incubation period and
the clinical onset serial interval (COSI).
Methods: Data were obtained from original outbreak investigation forms (n = 406) and from published data (n = 45).
Incubation periods were calculated for person-to-person exposure, for laboratory-acquired infections, and for presumed
zoonotic exposures. Similar analysis was conducted for COSI, using only cases with unambiguous person-to-person
transmission where both the primary and the secondary case patients had well-defined illness onsets.
Results: Seventy-six cases were retained for the incubation period analysis. Incubation periods ranged from a
minimum of 2 days in the case of two laboratory workers to a maximum of at least 26 days for a person-to-person
household transmission. Thirty-eight cases were retained for COSI analysis. The median COSI was 11 days, with an
interquartile range of 8 to 15.
Conclusions: This study extends the maximum known incubation period of Marburg virus disease to 26 days. The
analysis was severely hampered by a lack of completeness in epidemiologic data. It is necessary to prioritize obtaining
more accurate epidemiologic data in future outbreaks; greater use of COSI may facilitate an improved understanding
of outbreak dynamics in Marburg and other diseases.
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Marburg virus disease was the first identified filovirus
haemorrhagic fever, caused by two clinically indistinguish-
able enveloped single-stranded RNA viruses (Marburg
virus and Ravn virus) [1] closely related to the Ebola
viruses. It was first discovered in 1967 during an out-
break of haemorrhagic fever among laboratory staff in
Marburg and Frankfurt, Germany and Belgrade, Serbia
(then Yugoslavia) who had contact with Ugandan vervet
monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) [2]. Since that time,
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ber of laboratory infections (Table 1). Symptoms begin with
a non-specific influenza-like-illness (e.g., fever, headache,
myalgias) which may proceed to haemorrhagic manifesta-
tions, with death occurring in roughly 20–90% of cases [3].
Despite many years of experience with the viruses, lit-
tle is known about several important epidemiologic pa-
rameters relating to the development of Marburg virus
disease. The incubation period, one of the most basic
parameters, has been estimated as being up to 21 days
(typically 5–10 days) primarily from the laboratory-
acquired infections that occurred in 1967 in Europe; what
little information has been published about Marburg in-
fections in the natural setting in Africa has been gleaned
from isolated cases or small outbreaks (Table 1). Thisis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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Table 1 History of Marburg outbreaks, 1967–2008
Outbreak Circumstances Total cases Deaths (CFR) Source of data
Germany and Yugoslavia
ex. Uganda, 1967
Infected laboratory primates imported from Uganda;
lab workers and contacts developed illness
31 7 (23%) [2,4]
South Africa ex. Zimbabwe, 1975 Australian traveler to Zimbabwe visited South Africa
and developed symptoms; infected traveling companion
and South African nurse
3 1 (33%) [5]
Kenya, 1980 Visitor to Kitum cave died; infected doctor, who survived 2 1 (50%) [6]
Kenya, 1987 Visitor to Kitum cave died 1 1 (100%) [7]
Russia, 1988 A laboratory worker died after a needlestick at ‘Vektor’
bioweapons research facility
1 1 (100%) [8]
Russia, 1990 A laboratory worker was infected after a needlestick at
Vektor, but survived
1 0 (0%) [9]
DR Congo, 1998–2000 Outbreak originating among miners in a gold mine;
spread to community; sporadic cases for years after main
outbreak ceased
154 128 (83%) Primary data
Angola, 2004–2005 Urban outbreak amplified through nosocomial transmission 252 227 (90%) Primary data
Uganda, 2007 Informal gold miners in Kamwenge District, Uganda
infected; infection in mine +/− person-to-person
transmission
4 2 (50%) [3]
Colorado ex. Uganda, 2008 U.S. traveler visited ‘Python’ cave in Maramagambo forest
in Uganda; developed illness upon return to U.S.
1 0 (0%) [10]
Netherlands ex. Uganda, 2008 Dutch traveler visited ‘Python’ cave in Maramagambo forest
in Uganda; developed illness upon return to Netherlands
1 1 (100%) [11]
GRAND TOTAL 451 369 (82%)
CFR Case Fatality Ratio.
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1967 and 2008 (the last known occurrence), including un-
published data from the 1998–1999 Democratic Republic
of the Congo outbreak and the largest-ever 2004–2005
Angola outbreak, to develop estimates for the clinical incu-
bation period and the clinical onset serial interval (COSI; a
validated epidemiologic measurement defined as the time
between the onset of symptoms of the primary case and
the onset of symptoms of the secondary case)a [12]. These
data add to the epidemiologic knowledge of Marburg dis-
ease and may help inform future outbreak investigations.
Methods
Sources of data
Data were obtained from published case reports (n = 45)
for outbreaks other than the 1998–1999 Democratic Re-
public of the Congo and the 2004–2005 Angola outbreaks
(Table 1). Data from the latter outbreaks (n = 406) were
obtained from case investigation forms obtained by the
author. Only cases classified as Probableb or Confirmed
were retained. Thus, of the 451 known cases, 180 were
retained (43 Probable and 137 Confirmed). The sub-
analyses described below were performed on smaller sam-
ples because not all data were available for all patients.
Incubation period analysis
The criteria for determining the incubation period in
person-to-person exposure were as follows: patient pairswere chosen in which a secondary case could be linked
to another patient in the database. At least one of these
patients must have been lab-confirmed. Also, neither
case could have been specifically ruled out for Marburg,
usually by a negative lab result and plausible alternative
diagnosis. When an exact exposure event was not known,
an incubation period range was calculated based on the
first and last contact with the primary case.
For laboratory-acquired infection, incubation period
was calculated as the time from a known exposure inci-
dent to Marburg virus until onset of symptoms. Where
exact exposure could not be determined, incubation period
was calculated from last known work with infectious virus
until onset of symptoms.
For presumed zoonotic infection (e.g., isolated cave/
mine incursions or contact with dead animals), incuba-
tion period was calculated from time of exposure to the
zoonotic source, if its date could be identified precisely,
until onset of symptoms. In one case (Netherlands ex.
Uganda, 2008), the exact exposure was not clear but was
strongly suspected to be a specific cave incursion [11].
Data were entered into STATA/SE 11.0 (Stata Corp.,
College Station, TX).
Clinical outcome serial interval (COSI)
Because of the inherent uncertainty in determination of
incubation period, the analysis above was repeated using
the COSI. Only cases with unambiguous person-to-person
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those involving three miners in Uganda in 2007 [3] were
discarded. Both the primary and the secondary case were
required to have well-defined illness onsets.
Results
Many cases, especially from the 1967 outbreak, were not
described in sufficient detail to allow thorough analysis.
Additionally, most case investigation forms from DR
Congo and Angola were only partially completed. Data
from Probable and Confirmed patients were pooled for
further analysis.
Among the 154 cases for whom age was available, the
median age was 30 years (range <1 to 88 years). Primary
(n = 41) cases were significantly older (median 35 years)
than secondary (n = 31) cases (median 28 years) (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p = 0.0011).
58% of the cases were female. There were significantly
fewer females among primary cases (37%) than among
the secondary cases (77%) (Z-test, p = 0.0006).
The overall case fatality ratio (n = 149) was 66%; there
was no significant difference between primary and sec-
ondary cases.
Incubation period
76 cases were examined for this analysis. 53% were fe-
male. The median age (n = 75) was 30, with an inter-
quartile range of 20 to 43, statistically equivalent to the
analyzed cases as a whole. The case fatality ratio was
47%.
Incubation periods ranged from a minimum of 2 days
(in the case of two laboratory workers from Marburg for
whom precise exposures were known) to a maximum of
at least 26 days (in a woman from Uige who had ex-
tended contact with an unconfirmed case, the last con-
tact being 26 days prior to her symptoms), or 23 days (in
the case of the infant child of a confirmed case, with
whom the last contact was 23 days prior to his illness).
Only 18 cases had precise exposure dates that allowed
for calculation of incubation period statistics. Of these, 4
were categorized as exposures to laboratory animals, 4
were healthcare exposures, 4 were cave or mine incur-
sions, 3 were exposures to cell culture, 2 were patients
from Uige with single exposures such as attending a fu-
neral, and one was sexual exposure to a recovered partner.
Overall, the median incubation period was 7 days, with a
range of 2 to 13 days; there was no significant difference
between primary and secondary cases (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p = 0.47). The small number of cases in each cat-
egory precluded meaningful analysis by exposure category.
Clinical Onset Serial Interval (COSI)
The expectation was that using the COSI would pro-
vide for a greater sample size for analysis than did theincubation period; this turned out not to be the case.
The number of samples included in this analysis was thus
38 (22 from Angola, 12 from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, 2 from South Africa, and 1 each from Serbia
and Kenya), reflecting 76 primary-secondary pairs. The
median COSI was 11 days, with an interquartile range of
8 to 15.
Discussion
This study attempted to combine data from a variety of
Marburg virus outbreaks for the purposes of evaluating in-
cubation period and clinical onset serial interval (COSI).
In the first analysis, the median incubation period was
7 days. Interestingly, there was no significant difference
in incubation period observed in secondary versus pri-
mary cases, despite the initial suggestion from the 1967
cases that this was the case. This may be because, in the
initial laboratory infections, there was an overwhelm-
ingly large difference in inoculum between the primary
laboratory exposures and the secondary person-to-person
exposures; in later primary exposures, exposure was more
often to an animal or mine, where the inoculum would be
expected to be significantly lower. The low sample size
precludes testing this hypothesis.
Also, unlike the original case reports, there was no dif-
ference in case fatality ratio between primary and second-
ary cases (possibly because of the same inoculum effect
described above). Primary cases were older and more
likely to be male than secondary cases, likely related to the
exposure setting (i.e., the definition of ‘primary’ indicates
an exposure such as laboratory work, hunting or mining,
activities likely to be undertaken by adult males, whereas
‘secondary’ exposure is largely in the domestic setting,
where contacts are more likely to be young and female).
An important finding in the incubation period analy-
sis was that two patients had incubation periods longer
than the acceptedc 21-day maximum incubation period
of Marburg disease. The patient with the longest incuba-
tion period, a minimum of 26 days, was a 52-year-old fe-
male with prolonged contact with an uninvestigated case
patient. It is possible that the precise date of the primary
patient’s death, being based on the secondary case’s re-
call, was misremembered. On the other hand, the patient
with a 23-day incubation period was an infant male with
laboratory-confirmed Marburg infection whose father
was a nurse who died of suspected Marburg infection
(as he died early in the course of the outbreak, no labora-
tory testing was performed) and was investigated. The in-
fant’s incubation period was calculated from the known
date that his father died (i.e., last exposure), so 23 days
again represents a minimum estimate. While later acquisi-
tion of Marburg virus from a source other than his father
is theoretically possible, it is less likely, as he did not have
contact with any other known or suspected cases. These
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used in outbreak responses as the maximum period when
defining exposure risk factors (e.g., ‘attendance at a funeral
in the past 21 days’), and it is also used as the basis for de-
claring the end of a Marburg outbreak (42 days, i.e., two
incubation periods, since the last known case). On the
other hand, it has already been observed that the max-
imum incubation period for Ebola, while usually claimed
to be 21 days, may be up to 25 days [13]; yet there do not
seem to have been any major public health implications to
date as a result of retaining the shorter operational period.
In any case, it is expected that most cases will fall within
the more familiar 21-day window [14]. Further attention
should be paid to the maximum incubation period in fu-
ture Marburg outbreaks, and changes to the operational
maximum incubation period made if warranted by em-
pirical observation of any transmission beyond 21 days,
weighed against the significant operational strain of ex-
panding the operational incubation period to pick up the
small number of additional cases.
In the COSI analysis, the median COSI was 11 days.
The COSI is notable for its robustness in the face of
imprecisely-defined exposures, such as may occur when
a family member has repeated exposures while caring
for an infected person; while many people will be unable
to determine when they may have been infected, few
people forget when a severe acute illness began. The im-
plication of there being a median COSI of 11 days versus
a median incubation period of 7 days is that an infection
is most likely to be transmitted around the 4th day of ill-
ness; the reason for this are likely a complex interplay
between virus kinetics and patient behaviour.
The greatest limitation to these analyses is the low
sample sizes involved. In earlier cases, original records
were unavailable; however, even in cases where original
records were available (i.e., the D.R. Congo and Angola
outbreaks), most forms were woefully incomplete, lea-
ding to multiple missing data for a given variable (for
example, less than 10% of Angola cases were complete
enough to calculate the incubation period). This was
compounded by the existence of different forms, which
often contained different variables, from different pe-
riods of an outbreak.
An additional challenge in interpreting data lies with
the ambiguity of certain questions. For example, the ques-
tion “were you hospitalized” could potentially be a useful
proxy for illness severity (if meant to indicate hospitali-
zation after disease onset), or could indicate risk of noso-
comial infection (if meant to indicate hospitalization prior
to disease onset); since the intent of the question was to
assess for nosocomial infection, this question would have
been clearer if it had been phrased “in the period of 1
week to 1 month prior to your illness, were you hospi-
talized?”. Other examples of un-interpretable questionsincluded open-ended questions, such as “what type of
contact did you have with a suspected case?” (This pro-
duced a wide variety of answers, including “direct,” per-
sons’ names, relationships, and activities). Open-ended
questions have their place early in the outbreak, for ex-
ploratory purposes; however, they must quickly be sup-
planted by questions whose answers are quantifiable.
During the design of questionnaires, it is also important
to ask “what am I going to do with the results of this ques-
tion?” (In other words, is the question actionable?). If no
clear action is suggested by the results of a question, it
should be omitted. The exception is the inclusion of ques-
tions designed to answer research questions (for example,
exposure to wild animals as possible reservoirs). In the
long run, taking the time to answer these research ques-
tions in the field may actually save resources by preventing
future epidemics.
Setting aside a few hours at the beginning of an out-
break to thoughtfully design a questionnaire containing
quantifiable and actionable questions is well worth the
time. In the heat of the moment, methodical descriptive
epidemiology often takes second priority to such activ-
ities as infection control and case finding; unfortunately,
without data (and their real-time analysis), such activ-
ities are often misguided and unsuccessful. It is equally
important to make sure that once a question is inclu-
ded on a questionnaire, it is asked and the results are
recorded. While the questions needed in each outbreak
are different, many of the principles, and even some of
the questions, are universal. It would be useful for the
World Health Organization to develop a “minimum
standard” for the collection of data during an outbreak,
to be ignored at one’s peril. These issues are not dis-
similar to the problem of poor clinical documentation
during outbreaks of Marburg and other haemorrhagic
fevers [15,16].
Finally, it is important to expand the use of the COSI
as an important epidemiologic tool for outbreak assess-
ment and action. It can be a useful tool for identifying
the pathogen, and evaluating the success of control in-
terventions. The main advantage of the COSI is that it
is more easily measurable than the incubation period
(as patients are more likely to know when they became
ill than when they were exposed). Unfortunately, as an
epidemiologic tool, it currently has limited use because
a disease’s published incubation period is often used
to help identify the pathogen, but few diseases have
published COSIs (one notable exception is influenza
[17,18]), and calculation of the COSI from available
statistics is difficult. The scientific and public health
community should endeavor to characterize the COSIs of
important outbreak-prone diseases, as well as look into
ways to operationalize the use of COSI in outbreak
response.
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This study extends the maximum incubation period
of Marburg virus disease to 26 days. The analysis was
severely hampered by a lack of completeness in epi-
demiologic data. In order to better characterize the epi-
demiology of Marburg, it will be necessary to prioritize
obtaining more accurate exposure and clinical history data
in future outbreaks; greater use of COSI may facilitate
an improved understanding of outbreak dynamics in
Marburg and other diseases.Endnotes
aThe COSI depends on three things: the interval be-
tween the time of primary case’s infection and the be-
ginning of infectiousness (not necessarily the beginning
of symptoms); the duration of infectiousness; and the
time from infection of the secondary case until clinical
disease onset, also known as the incubation period.
The COSI for a given pathogen can change depending
on circumstances, much as with incubation period. For
instance, it is altered by more severe disease, which for
example can lead to earlier infectiousness and therefore
a shorter COSI. It is also altered by successful control
measures, because the shorter duration of infectious-
ness (due to recovery or isolation) leads to a shorter
COSI.
bThe definition of ‘probable’ varied slightly from one
outbreak to another, but primarily involved a clinically
compatible syndrome with an epidemiologic link to a
laboratory-confirmed case.
cThere appears to be no objective evidence for this
maximum incubation period for Marburg disease, ex-
cept extrapolation from the maximum incubation period
for Ebola, which was reported as 21 days by Breman in
1977 [19].Competing interests
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